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Comment
Broadening the Use of Municipal Mortgages
Peter Molkt
This Comment considers whether states and municipalities might
benefit from altering prevailing practices regarding security interests and
bond issues. After reviewing the primary methods of municipal bond
financing and their current treatment by courts, the Comment arguesfor a
broader use of municipal property as collateralfor bonds, suggesting the
typical connection between revenue stream and revenue source with revenue
bonds be broken, and that property be attached to general obligation bonds.
The Comment proceeds by exploring some policy implications related to its
proposal and concludes that expanded power may be in municipalities' best
in terests.
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Introduction
Recent difficult economic conditions have affected the entire
economy. Property values have plummeted, unemployment has increased,
t J.D. Yale Law School, expected 2011; M.A. Yale University, expected 2011; B.A. Amherst College,
2006.
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and consumer spending has declined. Although the recession's impact on
the federal budget has been well publicized,' the effects spill over into
state and local budgets as well. 2 Most states and municipalities require
balanced budgets. 3 Unlike the federal government, decreases in revenue at
the state and local level must be accompanied by corresponding decreases
in spending or by new taxes or other offsetting revenue increases.
These pro-cyclical spending cuts and tax increases act to slow
economic recovery by decreasing government and consumer spending.
Unfortunately, municipalities are relatively limited in creative solutions to
this problem. Traditional bond issues, a non-cyclical source of revenue,
may not be a viable option. Although municipalities can generally issue
bonds 4 as an alternative to tax hikes or spending cuts, the issues may
require relatively high interest rates at a time when the recession-saddled
public lacks money to invest in bonds or anything else.5 These high
interest rates come at a price, as they tie up a greater proportion of future
budgets needed to service the debt.
Allowing municipalities to attach property as security on bondsthereby reducing bond rates-could serve as a needed creative alternative.
This practice would make it easier for municipalities to issue bonds during
recessions, as well as lower their debt service in and out of recessions.
Some limited mortgaging of public property already occurs today. This
Comment proposes a broadening of municipal mortgaging, while still
allowing sufficient safeguards to minimize the risk of losing essential
properties to foreclosure. This broadening would increase the
attractiveness of bond issues, reduce interest rates, and give municipalities
more flexibility to refrain from pro-cyclical behavior during recessions.
The Comment proceeds by discussing general obligation and revenue
bonds, the primary ways by which municipalities achieve financing. The
1
See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman & Deborah Solomon, Decade of Debt: $9 Trillion, WALL ST. 1.,
Aug. 26, 2009, at Al.
2
State and local tax revenues in the third quarter of 2009 were down seven percent
from the same quarter a year earlier. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NATIONAL TOTALS OF STATE AND LOCAL TAX
REVENUE, BYTYPE OF TAX, available at http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/qtax/tablel.pdf (last visited Jan.
25, 2010). Municipal budget deficits, without further action, are estimated to be $56 to $83 billion
from 2010 to 2012. CHRISTOPHER W. HOENE, RESEARCH BRIEF ON AMERICA'S CITIES: CITY BUDGET
SHORTFALLS AND RESPONSES: PROJECTIONS FOR 2010-2012, at 1 (2009), available at

http://www.nlc.org/ASSETS/5A4EFB8CFlFE43AB88177C808815B63F/BudgetShortFalls-10.pdf.
3

Ronald K. Snell, State Balanced Budget Requirements: Provisions and Practice, NAT'L

CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Mar. 2004, http://www.ncsl.org/?Tabld=12651 (noting that
forty-nine of fifty states have such requirements); Municipal Finance and Budget Process, National
League of Cities, http://www.nlc.org/about-Cities/cities-101/148.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2010)
("[U]nder state law, nearly all cities operate under balance-budget requirements."); see, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-122 (West 2008) (requiring municipalities to set taxes to balance budgets).
4

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-369 to -380 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009).

5
When incomes decrease during a recession, consumers have less money for all
purposes, including investing in bonds. Therefore, municipalities must offer higher interest rates
to entice enough buyers to purchase municipal bonds. This effect may be partially offset if
consumers react to recessions by increasing their propensity to save, which would mitigate how
much municipalities must increase rates.
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Comment then surveys how these bonds currently interact with
municipalities' power to mortgage property, and proposes a broader use
of the mortgage power that would provide better rates on bonds without
sacrificing much flexibility. The Comment finally turns to the policy
justifications both for and against giving municipalities this broader
power. It concludes with a recommendation for granting the power to
mortgage public property in limited circumstances, which will increase
municipalities' fiscal flexibility.
I.

Types of Municipal Bond Issues

Municipalities typically issue bonds as either "general obligation"
bonds or "revenue" bonds. 6 General obligation bonds are secured by the
municipality's full faith and credit, meaning the municipality is required to
draw from all available revenue services to meet these obligations. 7 Thus,
general obligation bonds are well secured and usually carry low interest
rates. On the other hand, revenue bonds are secured only by the revenue
stream generated from a distinct source, usually the underlying project the
bonds are used to finance. 8 With traditional revenue bonds, if the
borrower defaults, the lender has no claim to any other assets, 9 unlike
general obligation bonds where the lender can force repayment from any
revenue available to the municipality. Because revenue bonds have less
underlying security, they tend to carry higher interest rates than general
obligation bonds. 10
Many municipalities have ceilings on the amount of debt they can
incur. 1 Typically, general obligation bonds count toward this ceiling, but
revenue bonds do not. 12 Revenue bonds thus offer an important form of
financing if municipalities approach or break through their debt ceiling.
Because pure revenue bonds are self-funded by an identified revenue
stream, they do not count as debt since citizens of the municipality are not
6
See Robert W. Doty & John E. Petersen, The Federal Securities Laws and Transactionsin
Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 283, 304 (1976); see also 1 M. DAVID GELFAND, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING §§ 1.4, 2.13, 2.25 (2009) (discussing how states and

municipalities finance debt through bonds).
7
GELFAND, supra note 6, § 10.20.
8

Id. § 10.21.

9
10

Id.
See, e.g., M. David Gelfand, Seeking Local Government FinancialIntegrity Through Debt

Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers'

Revolt, and Beyond, 63 MINN. L. REV. 545, 560-61 (1979) (noting that revenue bond interest rates
typically exceed interest rates of comparable general obligation bonds by 0.25% to 1.25% because
of this difference in security).
11
See, e.g., id.at 546-51 (discussing the history and theory of debt ceilings); see also, e.g.,
ARIZ. CONST. art IX,§ 8 (requiring a debt ceiling of six percent of taxable property unless otherwise
approved by voters); OKLA. CONST. art X, § 26 (requiring a debt ceiling of five percent of taxable
property).
12
See, e.g., City of Joliet v. Alexander, 62 N.E. 861, 861-62 (Ill. 1902); State ex rel.
Hammermill v. La Plante, 205 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. 1973); GELFAND, supra note 6, §§ 10.20, 10.21.
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adversely affected by the indenture; if the project succeeds, then the
project pays for the bonds, and if the project fails, then residents do not
have to pay for the default. 13 The municipality can be conceived as merely
managing the revenue for the lenders, while assuming no financial liability
of its own. 14 As noted previously,15 this decreased payout to lenders in
case of default (relative to general obligation bonds) translates into higher
interest rates, encouraging some municipalities to attach property as
additional security to these revenue bonds. Attaching security increases
the expected payoff that lenders have under a default, which in turn
reduces the interest rate that the municipality must offer on these secured
bonds. Some examples of the current use of mortgage-secured bonds and
their ramifications are considered in the next Part.
II. The Legal Landscape
To help bridge the gap between general obligation and revenue
bonds, some municipalities have given lenders mortgage interests as
additional security for the revenue bonds. The pledged property usually
consists of the underlying property bought or built with the bonds, or
already-owned property that the bonds are used to improve or modify. For
example, bonds to finance waterworks construction could be secured by
the newly purchased land and eventual waterworks 16 or, if the bonds are
used to improve existing waterworks, they could be secured by the
17
waterworks and land.
Some states explicitly authorize the issuance of mortgage-secured
bonds by municipalities.' 8 Others provide ambiguous power grants that do
not clearly address the power to mortgage property,' 9 while still others
grant this authority but limit how it can be wielded. 20 The ability of a
13
See State ex rel. Morgan v. City of Portage, 184 N.W. 376, 377 (Wis. 1921).
14 See id.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15
State ex rel. Morgan, 184 N.W. at 376.
16
17
Alexander, 62 N.E. at 861.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-81-141 (1975).
18
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-148 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009) (giving the ability to
19
"hold, condemn, lease, sell, manage, transfer, release and convey such real and personal property
or interest therein absolutely or in trust as the purposes of the municipality or any public use or
purpose ... require"). This type of broad power grant has been held both to allow and not allow
municipalities to mortgage property. Compare Adams v. City of Rome, 59 Ga. 765 (1877)
(determining that similar language gives the power to mortgage property), with Vaughan v.
Comm'rs of Forsyth County, 118 N.C. 636 (1896) (ruling that similar language did not include the
power to mortgage property). Connecticut municipalities can mortgage property if the property is
held by a municipally-created authority, but the municipality's power to mortgage property
directly is ambiguous. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-130(b), -130(d) (West 2008).
See, e.g., TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (requiring that "[tihe property of counties, cities and
20
towns, owned and held only for public purposes, such as public buildings and the sites therefor,
fire engines and the furniture thereof, and all property used, or intended for extinguishing fires,
public grounds and all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public shall
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municipality to mortgage property in some form is not in serious doubt
then, as long as the power has been explicitly granted.
While securing revenue bonds with previously owned property and
securing revenue bonds with newly acquired property appear to be
similar financing methods, courts treat them quite differently. Debt limits
are a way to prevent municipal bankruptcies, 2' and mortgages of
previously owned property increase this default risk by putting
22
municipalities in a worse position than before the loan if they default.
Alternatively, securing bonds with the newly acquired property leaves the
23
municipality in the same position as before the issue if it defaults, so
these forms of revenue bonds do not count towards debt limits.
Revenue bonds secured by newly acquired property are not
particularly uncommon. The following Part considers advantages of
expanding this process in two ways: by augmenting revenue bond security
with previously owned property unrelated to the revenue bond stream,
and by using mortgages as additional security for general obligation
bonds. Neither of these topics has been the focus of legal literature, 24 yet
both offer potential advantages that make them worthy of consideration.

III.

Advantages of Broadening the Use of Mortgage Power

Expanding the scope of securing bonds with property could provide
numerous benefits to the municipality and its citizens. In particular, the
municipality should achieve a reduction in interest rates on both its
revenue and general obligation bonds.
A.

Reduction in Revenue Bond Rates

Although some jurisdictions have secured revenue bonds by
mortgages, the mortgaged property tends to be the property that produces
the revenue stream pledged to pay the bond. 25 Even though the mortgage
be exempt from forced sale and from taxation, provided, nothing herein shall prevent the
enforcement of the vendors lien, the mechanics or builders lien, or other liens now existing").
21
See Gelfand, supra note 10.
22
State ex rel. Hammermill v. La Plante, 205 N.W.2d 784, 804 (Wis. 1973). However, if
previously owned property of equal or lesser value than the newly acquired property were
mortgaged instead of the newly acquired property, then the municipality may be in a relatively
better position when it defaults. It would maintain control over the more valuable, newly acquired
property, although revenue from the newly acquired property would still belong to the lender.
Perhaps in some cases, contrary to the accepted view, revenue bonds secured by previously
owned property should be treated the same as revenue bonds secured by newly acquired
property.
23
Id.
For example, two prominent treatises on municipalities and municipal financing
24
consider at most the situation where revenue bonds are secured by newly acquired property. See
GELFAND, supra note 6, §§ 1.4, 2.25; 10 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28.43 (3d ed.
2009).
25
See, e.g., supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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provides some security, the security is of only limited value because of the
high positive correlation between the value of the security and the revenue
stream. When the security produces the revenue stream, and the revenue
stream dries up sufficiently so it cannot cover scheduled payments, the
value of the security as encapsulated by its ability to produce future
revenue has also diminished. Thus, the value of the security decreases in
circumstances where it is most likely the security will be called upon to
serve its loss-limiting purpose.
A broader use of the mortgaging power could break this positive
correlation between property and revenue stream. Pledging property with
value less strongly correlated with the revenue stream results in a less
volatile overall security package and decreases lenders' expected losses,
thereby increasing their expected return under default and reducing the
26
bonds' interest rates.
One might wonder why a municipality would bother with a revenue
bond secured by an outside property source instead of simply issuing
general obligation bonds with their low interest rates, since both types of
financing are treated as debt and would count towards applicable debt
ceilings. Revenue bonds, whether or not secured by property, offer
flexibility that general obligation bonds cannot. 27 A municipality would
have a difficult time abandoning a general obligation bond, because
general obligation bonds require the municipality to increase taxes on its
citizens to meet the obligation. However, a municipality can abandon a
mortgage-backed revenue bond, in which case it could lose the property
and the revenue stream, but the taxpayers would not be ultimately
required to meet the obligation. Although both the revenue bond backed
by outside property and the general obligation bond count towards debt
ceilings, the revenue bond could be better received by property owners
who need not worry about tax hikes to service bonds on underperforming
projects. 2 8 A municipality could also always increase taxes to ensure
holders of revenue bonds are paid, essentially giving it the option, but not
the requirement, to treat the revenue bond as a general obligation bond.
B.

Reduction in General ObligationBond Rates

Securing general obligation bonds with property should also reduce
the rates that municipalities must offer on their general obligation bonds.
26

The potential gains are also tempered, but because lenders are not equityholders,

they only care that the downside risk is reduced so that the revenue stream combined with the

property value will cover the loan.
27
Revenue bonds may be less flexible than general obligation bonds in municipal
bankruptcy, however. See infra Section III.B.

28
Of course, even with property-secured revenue bonds, the municipality might feel
pressure to ensure the property is not lost, and might increase taxes to do so. But even in
situations where this is the case, the municipality would have the option, but not the requirement,
to treat the revenue bond as a general obligation bond.

Broadening the Use of Municipal Mortgages
General obligation bonds are well-secured by the "full faith and credit" of
the municipality, which works well when the municipality is solvent.
However, if the municipality declares bankruptcy, holders of general
obligation bonds become general creditors and thus receive only the same
pro rata share as other general creditors in bankruptcy. 29 Further, unlike
bankruptcy under Chapter 11, a municipal bankruptcy has no requirement
that unsecured claims receive the liquidation value of their claims for
30
confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.
A mortgage, on the other hand, is a security interest that survives in
municipal bankruptcy. 31 Thus, holders of general obligation bonds secured
by additional property could expect a higher payoff in bankruptcy than
holders of traditional general obligation bonds, who are treated as
unsecured creditors. Even though municipal bankruptcies are relatively
rare and usually involve smaller municipalities, 32 several high-profile
34
33
cases (including Bridgeport, Connecticut; Orange County, California;
3
and Vallejo, California S), as well as looming bankruptcies including
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 36 and the near bankruptcy of Jefferson County,
Alabama, 37 remind us that municipal bankruptcies can be a very real
threat considered by lenders when determining interest rates. Secured
general obligation bonds would come at the expense of increased costs for
abandoning the obligation, but this cost emerges only in the case of a
municipal bankruptcy.
C.

Summary

Securing both revenue bonds and general obligation bonds with
outside property could achieve reductions in interest rates that
municipalities must offer on these bonds. A lower interest rate on bonds
corresponds to lower expenditures on servicing the bonds, reducing the
size of the required budget and allowing for tax decreases or for spending
on other items. These benefits are particularly helpful for state and local
29
See, e.g., In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist, No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 973-74 (Bankr. D.Neb.
1989); see also Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035,
1048 (1997) (noting that general obligation bonds "are not secured for bankruptcy purposes
because they do not have a concrete interest in any of the municipality's property").
30
See In reSanitary&Improvement DisL, 98 B.R. at 974. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 943 (2006)
(noting the requirements for confirmation of a bankrupt municipality's plan), with 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(7) (2006) (listing the requirements for confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan).
31
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)(1), 901(a) (2006).
32
See Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search o a Problem,
27 YALE J. ON REG. 351 (2010).

33

In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 335 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).

34
35

In re County of Orange, 183 B.R 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).

lanthe Jeanne Dugan & Kris Maher, Muni Threat- Cities Weigh Chapter 9, WALL ST. J.,
36
Feb. 18, 2010, at C1. Harrisburg's controller was quoted as saying "(b]ankruptcy is inevitable." Id.
37

See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Regulator Reviews Troubles in Municipal Bond Securities, N.Y.

TIMES, July 1, 2009, at 83.
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governments during economic downturns, because such governments
generally require balanced budgets. 38 Nevertheless, broadening the use of
mortgages on municipal bonds has potential negatives, considered in the
following Part.
IV.

Concerns with Broader Mortgage Power

In addition to worries that may arise whenever power is delegated to
government officials, 39 there is a unique concern that essential public
property could be lost in foreclosure. Restricting what and how property
can be mortgaged mitigates this concern. Another concern is that overall
bond interest rates may not decrease because the decrease in the rates of
secured bonds might come at the expense of increased unsecured bond
rates. Particular factors of the municipal bankruptcy process moderate this
concern as well.
A.

Public PropertyCould Be Foreclosed

A significant concern that could be levied against broader mortgaging
of public property is that if the municipality defaulted on these loans, the
collateral property could be seized by private interests and would no
longer be publicly owned. For mortgages to have any effect on bond
interest rates, foreclosure must be an enforceable option. While this
concern may initially cause hesitation, further consideration reveals that
mortgaging could still be expanded without the risk of losing essential
municipal properties. Restraints could be put into place to ensure both
that the chance of foreclosure is small, and that the properties subject to
foreclosure are not essential for municipality operation.
Mortgaging public property could be accomplished in a conservative
manner to minimize the chance of forfeiture while still deriving value from
the previously unencumbered land. For example, municipalities may be
given the power to use property as collateral for debt only if the property's
value greatly exceeds the debt's amount, say by four hundred percent.
Some reduction in bond interest rates for that debt should occur because
the debt is secured, and because the reduction would be achieved with
only a slight risk of property forfeiture by the municipality. 40 Of course,
38 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
39
These might include the risk of corruption or mismatched interests between
government officials and their constituents. Because these concerns are not unique to the present
topic, they are left to further development in other literature.

40 Outside of bankruptcy, property forfeiture would occur only on revenue bonds, and
then only when the value of the property fell below the outstanding debt balance. If the collateral
were initially required to exceed 400% of the debt, then property values would need to contract
by three-quarters plus whatever principal had been paid for the rational municipality to consider
forfeiting the property-an unlikely event even given the current deterioration in land values. If
property values do not decrease to this point, then the municipality has an incentive to find
revenue from other sources, perhaps increased taxes, to ensure it does not default on payments.
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bondholders must be prohibited from foreclosing without a default, since
their over-securitization ensures they would be paid in full in most cases
4
upon foreclosure. '
To mitigate public concerns about potential loss of essential public
property, particular classes of real property might be prohibited from
being offered as collateral. This prohibition, in addition to the requirement
that the value of pledged property greatly exceed debt, could be codified
and placed into states' statutes that define and limit municipal powers.
Important structures held in the public trust 42 such as streets or police
stations might fall into this prohibited category, whereas nonessentials
such as office space or vacant land might not; some property (like parks)
might be ambiguous. 43 Another perhaps more accurate way to envision
the divide would be to allow municipalities to mortgage only those
nonessential properties that are worth more in private hands than when
owned by the municipality, 44 so that no special value from public
45
ownership would be destroyed if the property were transferred.
While it may seem difficult to determine how safe to make the
mortgage or which properties should be allowed to be mortgaged,
municipalities are already making these determinations with their current
use of mortgages on revenue bonds. This Comment requires the same kind
of analysis, but would alter which assets are attached to which revenue
streams and, in the case of general obligation bonds, whether any assets
are attached at all.

Municipalities would never default on a secured general obligation bond outside of
insolvency because by definition they must meet the obligation as long as they remain solvent.
They may default on the bond within bankruptcy because the bonds no longer must be met by the
municipality's full faith and credit. However, as with revenue bonds outside of bankruptcy, the
municipality still would not default if the property's value exceeded the remaining principal on the
loan.
41
Municipalities should also be given a period to cure a payment default This period
must be long enough for the government to obtain revenue from other sources, such as from other
funds or from a special tax. Municipalities require this time to cure default so that any default
would be only a strategic default, where the outstanding principal exceeds collateral value, and
not a default stemming from short-term illiquidity with the value of collateral exceeding the debt
balance.
42
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (outlining the public trust
doctrine).
Prominent parks such as Central Park in New York City likely provide the public with
43
significant value that might be lost if the park were held privately. Other parks may not give such
unique value to the public as a public park, and so could be mortgaged. See Baker v. City of
Lexington, 273 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1954) (allowing a municipality to mortgage a public park for
construction of a swimming pool).
44
A similar distinction is drawn in Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When
Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 477
(1993). McConnell and Picker go on to conclude that bankruptcy courts should be given the power
to sell off these assets. Id.
45
More accurately, this formulation would allow property transfer when the gain to
private ownership exceeded any loss from public ownership. Although some public benefit might
be lost, the overall societal benefit would increase.
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Unsecured Bond Rates May Increase

Typical unsecured creditors have no security attached to their bonds.
In bankruptcy, these creditors are reimbursed by revenue that is earned or
by unattached assets that can be sold. If unsecured creditors fear that
revenue streams or assets could become attached as security to other
bonds, they would demand a higher interest rate because their interests
could become subordinated to secured creditors', decreasing their
expected payout in bankruptcy. 46 In theory, more expansive use of
mortgaging municipal property could be met with offsetting higher
interest rates or restrictive covenants on other bonds unsecured by
47
mortgages.
However, unsecured creditors are not treated the same way in
municipal bankruptcy as they are in private bankruptcy. Unlike unsecured
lenders in private bankruptcies, unsecured lenders to a bankrupt
municipality are largely unable to force sale of the municipality's
unsecured property to recoup loans. 48 General creditors of the
municipality are therefore interested in the municipality's property only to
the extent that it can produce a future revenue stream when held by the
municipality. Unlike unsecured lenders to individuals or businesses, who
would respond to this subordination by increasing interest rates,
unsecured lenders to municipalities should react less intensely to
subordination, if at all, and only to the extent that the secured property
could have produced unattached revenue in bankruptcy.
Municipalities already subordinate unsecured creditors' interests in
these revenue streams by issuing revenue bonds, thereby removing
revenue streams from the pool of assets that unsecured creditors can
access in bankruptcy. 49 Furthermore, additional subordination already
occurs when municipalities attach related previously owned property to
revenue bonds, 50 yet presumably, since both these subordination practices
continue, they must result in net interest rate reductions. Therefore, it is
likely that reductions in the bond rates from an increased use of property
as security would not be offset completely by increases in the rates
demanded by unsecured creditors.

46 See, e.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting:An
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J.FIN. ECON. 117, 118, 136 (1979). These problems have helped drive
the use of bond covenants. Id. at 136.
47
Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1054
(1984).
48
See, e.g., McConnell & Picker, supra note 44, at 472, 476-77.
49
Income from revenue streams attached to revenue bonds is treated as a security
interest in municipal bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 928 (2006).
50
See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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C.

Summary

Expanding municipal mortgage use raises two unique concerns: that
public property could be lost through foreclosure, and that unsecured
bond rates could rise to offset any reductions in secured bond rates. The
first concern can be effectively managed through placing restrictions on
how the municipal mortgage process is used. Ensuring mortgaged
property values greatly exceed bond amounts and prohibiting some
special property from being mortgaged reduces the chance that valuable
property will be foreclosed. Regarding the second concern, unique features
of the municipal bankruptcy process relative to private bankruptcies
ensure that any rise in unsecured debt rates would not offset the decrease
in secured debt from using municipal mortgages.
Conclusion
Although there are legitimate concerns about municipalities
exercising an expanded practice of mortgaging public property, they can
be minimized through a mixture of limitations and safeguards on the
exercise of this power. The resulting decrease in bond rates would provide
municipalities with the flexibility to either divert spending to other
projects or to reduce taxes. While there is a negative climate surrounding
mortgage securitization that stems from the current economic downturn,
this proposal does not come close to assembling the same risk factors that
led to the market collapse.sl Instead, a measured and carefully considered
broadening of using municipal property as security for bonds could allow
municipalities to unlock some of the value in publicly owned property.

51
For instance, municipalities would maintain significant ownership interests in their
property, which reduces the likelihood of default, unlike residential owners who bought houses
with little or no down payment Municipalities, as enduring entities, may also have more
reputational concerns than individuals, which may make them less likely to default and incur the
resultant higher bond rates in the future.
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